Several military training centres in Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha… have delivered training programs to military staff since the mid s. Since international media have reported a lot of Information Warfare exercises, conducted by military forces. The exercises are evidence of the transition from theory into practice.
But whatever these capabilities are, gaining power and superiority of cyber dimension has become a major issue in China: the global level of military development is measured through the level of Information Warfare capabilities.
The objective is to be able to win wars conditioned by information information warfare, cyber war before Concretely, the involvement of the civil sector is reflected in many ways: — China develops its military capabilities in close relationship with private industry and academia, putting into practice the policies promoting the connection between private and public sectors, civilian and military sectors.
This phenomenon can be observed in a great number of industrialized nations. Many actions are credited to Chinese hackers: waves of cyber-attacks following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy by NATO forces in Belgrade in , attacks against the interests of Taiwan; attacks against the U.
- masters thesis on microbiology or epidemiology?
- Please Consider Donating;
- uc college application essay prompt 2013.
- Chinese Information and Cyber Warfare;
- essay on economic growth in india 2012.
Chinese Information Warfare is mainly devoted to managing power relations with the outside to ensure the position of China on the world stage , but this may also be applied within the framework of its borders: information and cyberspace superiority are a matter of power in China. But in recent years, technological progress has played the spoilsport. Social networks Twitter, Facebook… have become new actors and tools on the national and international political scenes.
In August an article published on Cenews Site Central European News in Chinese described Twitter and the social networks as a new weapon, a tool of subversion, of cultural and political infiltration of a country, a tool for spreading rumors, a powerful political and destabilization tool.
But while truth is a fundamental requirement of Western communications strategies, Russian campaigns need not even remotely resemble the truth to be successful. Domestically, there is no challenge to the Kremlin narrative now that independent media have been effectively removed from the marketplace; and so, Russians who do not deliberately seek out alternative sources of information are tending to accept what they are being told about their own country and the outside world. Abroad, the Russian alternative reality need not be plausible in order to provide alternatives to the truth, since saturation coverage by Russian external media, the strictures of balance, and the efforts of the Kremlin troll army will ensure that it achieves penetration among its target audience regardless of credibility.
Conclusion: Implications for the Netherlands
Simply by causing confusion and doubt, these alternatives to the truth serve the purpose of undermining trust in objective reporting, and especially in official statements by Russia's adversaries and victims. Four days after the crash, by which time it was already clear that Russia held ultimate responsibility for the tragedy, the Russian Ministry of Defence held a press conference to present explanations absolving Russia. The scenarios presented were diverse and mutually contradictory, and did not stand up to the briefest examination by experts with even basic knowledge of the aircraft and missile systems claimed to be involved.
But this was not a Russian concern: their instant rejection by both foreign and Russian experts did not prevent them being reported in the West as well as receiving broad coverage within Russia.
Working Paper: Russia‘s Hybrid Warfare: a Success in Propaganda
In the same fashion, almost four months later when Russia issued crudely doctored satellite images suggesting the Malaysian airliner had been downed by a missile attack from a Ukrainian aircraft, these were instantly detected as fake - but this did not prevent the claims being reported, initially without qualification, by a range of Western media. Russian disinformation thus continues to reach its targets, sowing confusion and doubt abroad and obscuring the truth with a thicket of falsehoods. To dismiss the importance of Russian denials because they are implausible is also to underestimate the concept and power of the direct lie.
Given the habit of liberal leaders in democratic nations to attempt always to say something which at least resembles the truth, implausible denials are a ploy which Western media are particularly ill-equipped to respond to and report appropriately. Thus when Vladimir Putin denies that Russian troops are in Crimea or in eastern Ukraine, it is not important that what he is saying is plainly untrue - the approach is effective not only in press conferences, especially when unchallenged by a compliant media; but as Canadian Premier Stephen Harper found at the G20 summit in Brisbane, it also makes it impossible to confront or engage with President Putin even when face to face.
It has also been suggested that Russian disinformation campaigns are self-defeating because they lead their creators into a "discourse trap" - constraining their options by forcing them to subscribe to their own narratives and act in line with their own propaganda.
But this too risks disregarding the particular features that pertain in Russia, in particular the complete unconcern for truth, reality or even consistency. Within Russia, there is no discourse trap, since the picture of the world provided by Russian media is entirely under Kremlin control and can be adjusted at will to justify any leadership action to the domestic audience. Abroad, foreign audiences are already baffled by the multiplicity of conflicting narratives already available, and which few outside a narrow expert community will be tracking and attempting to expose as false.
Cyber Warfare The Conflict And Our Security Media Essay
In this way, while the discourse trap would be a severe constraint for leaderships which were obliged to be even partially truthful or consistent, it fails entirely to close in Moscow. Danger arises when successful pollution by Russia of the opinion-forming process in the West spills over into influence on the policy-making process itself. Many narratives absolving Russia or placing the blame for the current crisis elsewhere will find willing audiences in those policy circles which would wish to appease Russia and return to business as usual as swiftly as possible, as was the case following the armed conflict in Georgia in Even more dangerously, in circumstances which would require complete Western consensus - such as a decision on collective action to be taken by NATO - Russian information warfare could play a key role by fatally undermining the essential unity among Western allies.
The threat of Russian information campaigns is thus that they prepare the ground for future Russian action which would be directly counter to the interests of Europe and the West. By either undermining the will or support for deterrent measures, or sowing an entirely false impression that Russia is justified in its actions, Russia adjusts key variables in the security calculus determining the risk inherent in future assertive action against its neighbours. In the case of Ukraine, Russia felt the balance was tipped sufficiently in its favour to act; but Ukraine, and Georgia before it, are unlikely to be the last neighbours of Russia to fall victim to this calculation.
Current Russian ambitions, if followed to their conclusion, must necessarily lead to a more direct confrontation with the West. Russia now benefits from a highly developed information warfare arsenal which will be a key facilitator in preparing for further actions which the West will find unthinkable in advance, and unacceptable after the fact. Mittwoch, Februar Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik, Nr.
These new Russian investments cover three main areas: 1.
Need Writing Help?
Russian Domestic Media To use Russian doctrinal jargon, Russia has succeeded in "securing its national information space", and "preventing breaches" in it. Is it really hybrid? Hybrid Warfare: A Known Unknown? July NATO vs. Hybrid warfare — a known unknown? VOX 13 April NATO faces a wide range of multidirectional and multitargeted military and non-military security risks, terrorist actions being surprising, extremely violent and often unpredictable: assassinations, abductions, firings, attacks with conventional ammunition or improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, hijackings, cyber attacks, attack and occupation by force of strategic objectives, sabotages, etc.
The use of asymmetric methods of combat is not limited to official war zones, in recent years military or public persons of NATO states becoming frequently targets. Regardless the reasons for which these actions take place, hybrid threats must find echo not only in a defense strategy, but also in prevention and countermeasures.
- essay my favourite teacher.
- The Media as an Instrument of Information Warfare.
- pay to have coursework done!
NATO must adapt continuously to respond promptly to the new challenges of terrorism expansion, which does not recognize or consider state boundaries, national laws or public interest. Fall December - January September June Available on demand only [Please contact the Library].
Fifth Generation Warfare and the Challenges for Pakistan
Abstract: The authors give their view of hybrid operations, a new type of warfare that is actually the annexation of a part of a target country, and take a close look at the basic components of hybrid warfare that have a decisive effect on the conduct of hybrid operations. Mai January - March Hybrid war in Eastern Europe: non-military dimension. Abstract: The hybrid war plan was implemented on August 14, , when Russia started discriminating against Ukrainian exports, causing economic damage.
In the Kremlin launched the military component of the hybrid aggression and ratcheted up the energy component. The authors analyze the non-military dimension of Russia's external behavior and conclude that it has been using its energy resources and supply infrastructure to exert pressure on energy dependent countries. The worst scenario was used against Ukraine, and there is information to prove Russia's intention to block the supply and transit of gas in in order to annex eastern and southern Ukraine.
Events in are clear signs of the improved energy weaponry used by the Kremlin to achieve its geopolitical goals. The EU and world leaders must adopt a single and united position to counteract Russian hegemony as an energy superpower and bring the aggressor to within acceptable international frameworks.
NATO, the European Commission, the IEA, and the Energy Community Treaty Secretariat have to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of energy security, considering it from a security rather than from an economic point of view. October Is hybrid warfare something new? ORBIS, vol. PRISM, vol. Summer Hybrid Warfare with Chinese Characteristics S. Hybrid warfare: the future of warfare?